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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Contempt of

Case No.

LaRAE PETERSON.

9948

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The appellant, LaRae Peterson, appeals from a finding of the District Court of the Third Judicial District,
State of Utah, that she was in contempt of court in refusing to answer certain questions while a witness for the
prosecution in the case of State of Utah vs. Jean Sinclair.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After finding the appellant, LaRae Peterson, guilty of
contempt for refusing to answer a question propounded by
the prosecution in the case of State of Utah vs. Jean Sinclair, the court imposed a penalty sentencing her to serve
five days in jail.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits the finding of contempt should be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, LaRae Peterson, was called as a witness
by the State in the case of State of Utah vs. Jean Sinclair,
in which case the latter person was charged with the first
degree murder of Donald Foster. 1 The killing took place on
January 4, 1962 at the Susan Kay Apartments in Salt Lake
City. 2 LaRae Peterson, the appellant in the instant case,
was in the automobile in which she and the deceased had
just alighted from the automobile when he was shot and
killed. 3 The deceased and the appellant, LaRae Peterson,
had intended to get married, although the deceased was
still married at the time of his death. 4 It was the State's
contention that the motive for the killing in the instant
case was one of homosexual jealousy. The State introduced
into evidence a letter from Jean Sinclair to LaRae Peterson,
which stated :5
"Dearest One : I love you with all of me. I
didn't mean it for a minute (sorry that I ever met
you). You know that I didn't live until you loved
me. I love, want and need you and your love. Whatever I must do I will do. Please be patient and help
me, Honey. Your love is all that has kept me going.
I promise never to mention the men in your life
tSee Record in State VS. Sinclair, 9971.
1bid.
BJbid., R. 449.
•Ibid., R. 421.
15Jbid., R. 442.

2
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again. All I want is to have you and Cheryl Ann
happy. Please let me. All my love always. 2:45
a.m."
The evidence further disclosed that Jean Sinclair had made
gifts of various items to LaRae Peterson and had allowed
her to use space in Sinclair's nursing home so that Miss
Peterson could operate a beauty parlor, and Jean Sinclair
did so without charge. 6 Various other close relationships
between appellant and the defendant, Jean Sinclair, were
admitted. 7 During the course of the direct examination by
the prosecution, the following question was put by the prosecutor:8
Q. I'll ask you if you or Jean have ever committed any Lesbian acts with each other?
41

"MR. HATCH: Objected to as ambiguous.
"MR. MITSUNAGA: Also may the record show
Counsel does invoke the privilege pursuant to 70
Utah Code in reference to. Mr. Banks' question.
"MR. BANKS: I'll lay a foundation first of.
all for Mr. Hatch's objection.
''THE COURT: You may.
"Q.

(By Mr. Banks) Do you know what 'Les-

bian' is?
"A. Yes, sir.
"MR. BANKS: I'll reput the question then at
this time and allow whatever objections are going
to be made.
6 lbid., R. 414-419.
'Ibid.• R. 412-499.
81bid.• R. 427.
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"MR. HATCH: Will you hold your answer until We object.
"THE WITNESS: Yes.
"MR. BANKS: Will you re-read the last question prior to the objection.
" (Record read.)
"MR. HATCH : Permission to voir dire.
HTHE COURT: You may.
"VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
"BY MR. HATCH:
"Q.

Do you know what Lesbian acts are?

"A.

I imagine so.

"Q.

What are they?

"A.

Well, I don't know how I would explain

that.
"Q. If you know what they are, you can define them, I suppose, can't you?

"A. Well, I imagine that's when two women
more less- oh, have sexual relations with one another. Is that"Q. Is it possible for two women to have sexual relations with one another, to your knowledge?

"A.

I wouldn't know, sir.

"Q.

What in your way of thinking is a Les-

bian?
"A.

Just what I just said, sir.
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"Q. In other words, a person that has homosexual acts with another woman?

"A.

Yes.

"Q. But you don't. know whether two women
can have homosexual acts, is that correct?

"A.

Well, I imagine they can. I don't know.

"Q. What would be a homosexual act between
two women, in your mind?

"MR. MITSUNAGA: Your Honor, I'm going
to object to this whole line of questioning, Mr.
Hatch's testimony, if she's competent to testify this
would have to come within her own personal knowledge. On that basis, we'd invoke the privilege pursuant to the Utah Code.
''THE COURT: Are you citing a statute to the
Court?
"MR. MITSUNAGA: That's right. I'm citing
Statute of The Code, your Honor, 78-24-9, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.
"THE COURT: You'll have to refresh the
Court's memory as to that statute.
"MR. MITSUNAGA: The statute states that
the witness need not answer a question that has a
tendency to subject the witness to punishment for
a felony nor need to give any answer which will
have a tendency to degrade unless it is a very fact
in issue or to a fact from which a fact in issue
would be presumed."
There was additional argument by counsel in the presence
of the court, after which a recess was taken until the next
morning, at which time the following occurred :
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"MR. BANKS: I believe at the close of the last
session we had an unanswered question. Would the
Reporter please read the last question.
"(Reporter reading) Well, I'll put it this way
then. Have you had any homosexual acts with Jean
or she with you.
"MR. HATCH : May the record in addition to
my objection to ambiguity show a further objection
on the basis of immateriality and the basis of irrelevancy.
"THE COURT: The record may so show. The
objection will be denied.
"MR. MITSUNAGA: And I'm going to advise
my client at this time to refuse to answer the questions on the grounds that it tends to incriminate
and also degrade.
"MR. BANKS: We'll request the Court to compel an answer.
'iTHE COURT: Of course, the privilege, if it's
going to be claimed, must be claimed by the defendant - or by the witness, excuse me.
"THE WITNESS : Well, I refuse to answer on
the grounds that it would tend to incriminate and
degrade me.
"MR. BANKS : I'd request at this time that the
Court compel the witness to answer.
"THE COURT: Yes. Mrs. Peterson, the Court
feels that under these circumstances the way this
question is asked, and in connection with the legal
ramifications involved, that this privilege is not
claimable by you at this time under these circumstances. And, therefore, the Court orders you to
answer the question.
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"MR. HATCH : May the record note an exception on behalf of the Defendant Sinclair to the
Court's ruling.
"THE COURT: The record may so show.
"MR. MITSUNAGA: May the record further
show that the attorney for Miss Peterson further
notes an exception to the court's ruling.
"THE COURT: The record may so show.
"The Court further advises you, Mrs. Peterson,
that your refusal to answer this question upon the
direct order of this Court would also place you in
contempt of this Court.
"THE WITNESS : Yes, sir.
"THE COURT : You are again instructed to
answer this question. Will you repeat the question,
Mr. Reporter.
''(Question reread.)
"THE COURT: You are again ordered to ansswer, Mrs. Peterson.
"THE WITNESS: I still refuse.
"THE COURT: I didn't hear you.
uTHE WITNESS: I still refuse to answer.
"THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Banks."
Based upon the witness's refusal to answer, the court, at
a subsequent time, and out of the presence of the jury,
found the appellant guilty of contempt and sentenced her
to five days in jail.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLANT, LARAE PETERSON WAS
PROPERLY HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT
SINCE THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AND
REAL DANGER THAT HER ANSWER, TO
THE QUESTION PROPOUNDED BY THE
PROSECUTION, WOULD TEND TO SUBJECT
HER TO PUNISHMENT FOR A CRIME.
The appellant contends in her brief that the trial court
erred in punishing her for contempt for failure to answer
the question of whether she had engaged in any homosexual
acts with the defendant, Jean Sinclair. The appellant, in
her brief, makes the contention that the answer to the
question of whether or not she had engaged in any homosexual acts would tend to incriminate her by subjecting
her to punishment for the crime of sodomy. An analysis
of the record, it is submitted, discloses that there is little
likelihood that such would in fact be the case. In response
to a question from the prosecution as to how she would
define a lesbian act, she stated, "Well I imagine that's
when two women more or less - oh, have sexual relations
with one another" (R. 427, No. 9971). She then further
testified to the question of whether or not, to her knowledge, it would be possible for two women to have sexual
relations, "I wouldn't know, sir" (R. Ibid.). She then testified:
"Q. What in your way of thinking is a Lesbian?
"A. Just what I just said, sir.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
"Q. In other words, a person that has homosexual acts with another woman?

"A.

Yes.

"Q. But you don't know whether two women
can have homosexual acts, is that correct?
"A. Well, I imagine they can. I don't know."

The appellant's testimony, therefore, was that she had
no knowledge of whether or not sexual acts could be committed between two women. As a consequence, it appears
dear that appellant could not have committed any sexual
acts with the defendant, Jean Sinclair, or she would have
had knowledge of the capability of the commission of such
acts. Consequently, when she refused to testify on the
grounds that it might tend to incriminate her to the question of whether or not she had engaged in homosexual acts,
it was obvious that there was no real or substantial possibility that the answer to that question could tend to convict her of any crime since she had previously denied havmg any knowledge as to the possibility of whether or not
such acts could be performed between women.
It is submitted that on the basis of the record, as it
was then before the trial court, that there was no violation
of law such as would vitiate the contempt finding. The
appellant cites in her brief the Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, Article I, Section 12 of the State
Constitution, and 78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953, to sustain the
claim that the answer requested by the prosecution was
privileged. An analysis of these provisions and the law
applicable to the privilege against self-incrimination clear-
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ly demonstrates that the appellant may not avail herself
of their protection. This, when coupled with the facts of
record, which obviously indicate that the appellant had
no reason to fear that the answer to the posed question
would tend. to incriminate her, results in a conclusion that
the trial court was correct in its finding.

Federal Constitution: It is, of course, a well known
fact that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person "shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself * * *."
However, this provision is not applicable to the instant
case. The Fifth Amendment, self-incrimination privilege,
has been held by the United States Supreme Court not to
be applicable, through the Fourteenth Amendment, against
the states. Consequently, since the instant prosecution was
in the. state courts, the Fifth Amendment protection was
not available to the appellant.
In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the privilege
against self-incrimination provided for in the Fifth Amendment was not applicable against the states. The court relied upon its previous decision in Barron v. Baltimore, 7
Peters 243, 8 L. Ed 672 ( 1833) . The decision in the Twining case was also in accord with the dicta in the case of
Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 606 (1895), where Justice
Brown stated :

"* * * It is true that the Constitution does
not operate upon a witness testifying in the state
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courts, since we have held that the first eight
amendments are limitations only upon the powers
of Congress and the Federal courts, and are not
applicable to the several States, except so far as
the Fourteenth Amendment may have made them
applicable. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Fox
v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How.
84; Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 321; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252."
Most recently the Supreme Court has continued to follow
the decision of the Twining case, and in Adamson v. California, 322 U. S. 46 (1947), the Supreme Court of the
United States refused to abandon the Twning rule, stating:

"* * * the Bill of Rights, when adopted,
was for the protection of the individual against the
federal government and its provisions were inapplicable to similar actions done by the states. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Feldman v. United
States, 322 U. S. 487, 490. With the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it was suggested that
the dual citizenship recognized by its first sentence
secured for citizens federal protection for their elemental privileges and immunities of state citizenship. The Slaughter-House Cases (16 Wall. 36) decided, contrary to the suggestion, that these rights,
as privileges and immunities of state citzenship, remained under the sole protection of the state governments. This Court, without the expression of a
contrary view upon that phase of the issues before
the Court, has approved this determination. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 537; Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245, 261. The power to free defendants in state trials from self-incrimination was
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specifically determined to be beyond the scope of
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U. S. 78, 91-98. 'The privilege against self-incrimination may be withdrawn and the accused put upon
the stand as a witness for the state.' The Twining
case likewise disposed of the contention that freedom from testimonial compulsion, being specifically
granted by the Bill of Rights, is a federal privilege
or immunity that is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against state invasion. This Court held
that the inclusion in the Bill of Rights of this protection against the power of the national government did not make the privilege a federal privilege
or immunity secured to citizens by the Constitution
against state action. Twining v. New Jersey, supra,
at 98-99; Palko v. Connecticut, supra, at 328 * * *
We reaffirm the conclusion of the Twining and
Palko cases that protection against self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship.
"*

* *

"Specifically, the due process clause does not
protect, by virtue of its mere existence, the accused's freedom from giving testimony by compulsion in state trials that is secured to him against
federal interference by the Fifth Amendment.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 99-1f4; Palko
v. Connecticut, supra, p. 323. For a state to require
testimony from an accused is not necessarily a
breach of a state's obligation to give a fair trial.

* * *"
As a consequence, appellant may not be heard to contend
that the provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United
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States Constitution afford her any relief. 9 McCormick,
Evidence, 1954, page 257.

State Constitution : Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
"The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself * * * "
The clear meaning of this provision would limit the right
to claim a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to an accused. This conclusion arises from the fact
that only the term "accused" is employed rather than the
word "person" which appears in the Federal Constitution,
Amendment V, and in sixteen state constitutions, McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 51
Jnl. Crim. L., Crim. & Pol. Sci. 138, 139 (1960). The same
conclusion follows from the fact that there is no limitation
on the term evidence, restricting it to incriminating evidence, thus implying that only an "accused" is contemplated since he may refuse to even take the stand,.. whereas
a witness normally may not refuse to be sworn. In Re
Lemon, 15 Cal. App. 2d 82, 59 P. 2d 213 (1936); McCormick, Evidence, p. 257-8 (1954). Although the term "against
himself" may imply simple incrimination, it is broader than
the word incrimination is normally construed. In In Re
Sadleir, 97 Utah 291, 85 P. 2d 810 (1938), Mr. Justice
9

ln State V. Byington, 114 Utah 388,200 P. 2d 723 (1948), the court
seemed to intimate that the Federal Constitution would ·he available to a
?efendant in a civil trial to refuse to answer an incriminating question. The
tnference arises from that opinion :by virtue of the cour:t's using the word
"constitutions'' rather than limiting its dicussion to the Utah Constitution.
l;'o the e~t~nt that the Byington opinion would apply the Federal constitutional pnV1lege against self-incrimination to state proceedings, it is erron-

eous.
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Moffat infer:red that the constitutional privilege under Article I, Section 12 was limited to an accused. Thus he noted,
speaking of a statutory privilege of a witness :
"The principle behind the statute is declared
in Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah,
where among other things it is stated: 'The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself. This applies as well, before indictment or
information filed as afterward. In the instant case
the witness is not the accused. This provision of
the constitution is. referred to only as it tends to
form a background affecting the interpretation of
the statute relating to the duty of witnesses to answer or affirm under oath and the right a witness
has to claim privilege under the statute."
Additional support for the conclusion that the constitutional privilege under Article I, Section 12, Constitution
of Utah, is limited to an accused rather than a witness
appears in the history of the Constitutional Convention
from the remarks of the delegates during discussion on
'the section. See statement of Delegate Evans from Weber
County, 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention,
p. 308, where he comments as to what Section 12 gives:

"* * * all these rights which we vouch to
the person charged with crime."
Further, Delegate Thurman, 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, p. 312:
"We are speaking here of rights that the accused party has."
Although several states appear to have applied the
privilege against self-incrimination to witnesses as well as

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
an accused, Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2252, Vol.
VIII, p. 324; (a similar statement is found in the McNaughton Rev. 1961, p. 326), it does not appear that most
of the decisions covering such cases have applied constitutional provisions similar to that of Utah. In State v.
Quarles, 13 Ark. 307 (1853), the Arkansas Supreme Court,
by implication, construed a provision for the protection of
an ''accused" to cover a witness as well. Research has not
disclosed any other cases expressly construing the term
"accused" as including a witness; however, decisions from
other states having similar constitutional provisions have
allowed a witness to invoke a constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. Paynter Short v. State, 4 Harrington's Reports (Dela. 1845) ;1 ° Cooper v. Keyes, 246 Ky.
268, 54 S. W. 2d 933; Young v. Knight, 329 S. W. 2d 195
(Ky. 1959). However, these cases offer little support for
the construction of the Utah Constitution in a similar manner since they did not directly construe the language of
the particular constitution and the provisions of the Utah
Constitution appears to have been purposely selected to
restrict the constitutional claim to an accused. 11
Although the case of State v. Byington, 114 Utah 388,
200 P. 2d 723 (1948) indicated that it has been generally
recognized that constitutional provisions protect a witness,
:.oTbe Delaware Supreme Court apparently relied upon a common law right

of a witness to invoke privilege against self-incrimination rather than upon
the Delaware Constitution, since the court relied upon English authority
to sustain the witness's right to invoke the privilege and did not disc.,uss
at all the particular terms of the Delaware Constitution.
11
Althougb the Federal constitutional privilege bas been construed to be applicable to w~tn~, Counselman v. Hi~cbcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892);
Batalla V. Drstnct Court, 7 4 Puerto Rtco 2 6 6 {19 53) (construing the
Organic Act of Puerto Rico), these provisions of the Federal Constitjtltio-n
vary substantially from those found in Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah.
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the court did not thoroughly analyze the Utah Constitution,
misapplied the Federal Constitution and failed to consider
the fact that our Legislature has founded the right of a
witness to refuse to testify on statute rather than upon
the Constitution. It is submitted, therefore, that the Byington case should be limited to its particular facts and the
court should rule that Article I, Section 12 limits the constitutional privileg.e to the right of an accused to refuse
to give evidence against himself.
An additional reason presents itself in the instant case
as to why the appellant should be foreclosed from relying
upon the Utah Constitution for her claim of privilege, this
being that at the time of trial, appellant relied exclusively
on the statutory claim of right afforded to a witness and
did not purport to invoke the privilege, if any, which might
have been afforded by the State Constitution. Consequently, it is submitted that the appellant should be limited on
appeal to claiming that her statutory right provided by
78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953, was violated.

Statutory Privilege - 78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953: One
obvious reason why the provisions of Article I, Section 12
of the Utah Constitution were not intended to go beyond
an accused is found from the fact that the Legislature saw
fit to enact a statute granting to a "witness" a privilege
against self-incrimination or degradation. If the Legislature had thought the Constitution granted such a privilege,
they would not have enacted the statute. 78-24-9, U. C. A.
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1958, was enacted in 1951 (Laws of Utah 1951, Ch. 58,
Sec. 1); however, the same statute was passed, as it is now
worded, at the time of statehood, R. S. 1898, Sec. 3431.
Since many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention were members of the first Legislature of the State, it
would be difficult to argue anything but that R. S. 1898,
Sec. 3431 (78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953) was intended to go beyond the provisions of Article I, Section 12, not merely
restate part of it.
78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953, provides:
"A witness must answer questions lega] and
pertinent to the matter in issue, although his answer may establish a claim against himself; but he
need not give an answer which will have a tendency
to subject him to punishment for a felony; nor need
he give an answer which will have a direct tendency to degrade his character, unless it is to the
very fact in issue or to a fact from which the fact
in issue would be presumed. But a witness must
answer as to the fact of his previous conviction of
felony."
A clear reading of that statute would seem to limit the
privilege of a witness to refuse to answer incriminating
questions to those questions which would lead to the witness's conviction for a felony as that term is explained
and definded by 76-1-12 and 13, U. C. A. 1953. In In Re
Sadleir, 97 Utah 291, 85 P. 2d 810 (1938), two of the Justices felt the predecessor to the present statute covered
felonies as well as misdemeanors. Thus, Justices Moffat
and Larsen construed the word "felony" as including more
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than the definition of that term within the Code. Justices
Wolfe and Folland construed the statute as applying to
felonies and misdemeanors malum in se, but not misdemeanors, malum prohibitum. Justice Ephraim Hansen,
who was on the court at the time, did not sit. Subsequently the case was re-argued with Justices Folland and Hansen no longer being members of the court, and Justices
McDonough and Pratt sitting. Justice Pratt concurred in
a finding of reversal, but it is not clear whether he concurred in the determination that misdemeanors were included within the term "felony" as used by the privilege
statute. Justice McDonough did not concur in that determination but reserved the question. Justice Wolfe filed a
new dissenting opinion in which he continued to adhere
to the position that the word "felony" could not be construed to apply to all misdemeanors. As a consequence, the
opinion in In Re Sadleir cannot really be said to stand
for anything by way of precedent. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that the Legislature saw fit, although
some time subsequent, to completely repeal the then statute, Section 104-49-20, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, and
re-enact anew the same statute. It is inferable from this
action that the Legislature felt that the interpretation of
the statute should be approached from a fresh viewpoint.
It is submitted that unless the court is to do serious
injustices to the principle that unambiguous legislative
enactments are to be interpreted in accordance with the
clear import of their terms, that 78-24-9 must be construed
as being limited to felonies, and that misdemeanors are not
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encompassed within that term. 12 This would construe the
statute in the obvious manner which the Legislature intended. The term "felony' has been defined in 76-1-13, U.
C. A. 1953, as being a separate and distinct crime and not
encompassing misdemeanors. See also 76-12-12, U. C. A.
19f>~1. Additionally, such a construction is harmonious of
a common sense application of the privilege against selfincrimination. An appropriate balance must be drawn between the needs of law enforcement agencies to protect
the public and the needs to protect the individual rights of
an accused. See Wyman, A Common Sense View of the
Fifth Amendment, 51 Jnl. of Crim. Law, Crim. & Pol. Sci.,
155 (1960); Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today
(1955).

If the court is not inclined to so construe the statute,
then .the most obvious compromise would be to adopt the
position urged by Mr. Justice Wolfe that only those misdemeanors which are malum in se are so protected. This
12

Counsel contends for the first time on appeal that the answer to the
question concerning homosexual acts could incriminate the appellant by
proving, or by tending to subject her to punishment for vio.lating Salt
Lake City Ordinance 3 2-1-7 covering "indecent and immoral conduct."
Since this offense would only be a misdemeanor, it would not be within
the constsruction of 78-24-9, as urged by the Sta·te in this brief. However, an additional reason exists why 3 2-1-17, Revised Ordinances Salt
Lake City, 1955, is not applicable. First, this is not malum in se but
is malum prohibitum. See Anderson V. Commonwealth, 16 Am. Dec.
776 (Va. 1827): Thompson, Common Law Crimes Against Public
Morals, 49 Jnl. Crim. L., Crim. and Pol. Sci. 350, 351 (1958). Secondly. the viola·tion, if any, would have to have been committed within
Salt !-ake City, and the appellant was a resident of Sah Lake County, and
notbtng of record would appear to support that appellant would be within
~e geographical jurisdiction that would subject her to punishment, and
~ce appellant has the burden of proof that such answer would tend to
lllcriminate her, there would be insufficient evidence of record before this
court t<? support the appellant's burden. Third, the ordinance is probably
unconstttuttonal.
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is also most directly in harmony with the history of the
self-incrimination clause. Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed.,
Sec. 2250.

Meaning of Tending to Incriminate: It is submitted
that the court should, in the instant appeal, limit itself to
the consideration of whether the requested answer would
tend to incriminate as that term is used under 78-24-9.
However, even were the court to consider that the constitutional question is before it, the standard to be applied as
to whether or not the answer to a particular question would
criminate would be the same, and as related to the facts of
the instant case, the appellant would not be privileged to
make a claim of self-incrimination.
It is well settled that a claim of privilege must be more

than a fanciful or imaginary danger; it must be real and
relate to a "probability" of prosecution. 4 Jones, Evidence,
Sec. 861 (1958). McCormick, Evidence, p. 271 (1954),
comments on the required showing:
"A classic statement of the test is that 'the
Court must see, from the circumstances of the case,
and the nature of the evidence which the witness
is called to give, that there is reasonable ground to
apprehend danger to the witness from his being
compelled to answer. It seems that to meet this
test the court must find ( 1) that there is substantial probability that the witness has committed a
crime under the law of the forum, and (2) that the
fact called for is an essential part of the crime, or
is a fact which taken with other facts already
proved, or which may probably be proved, would
make out a circumstantial case of guilt."
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See also Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2261.
In Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362 ( 1917), the
United States Supreme Court noted the general standard
was expressed :
"The constitutional protection against self-incrimination 'is confined to real danger and does not
extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary
course of law.' "
Further the court noted :
"The general rule under which the trial judge
must determine each claim according to its own
particular circumstances, we think, is indicated with
adequate certainty in the above cited opinions. Ordinarily, he is in much better position to appreciate
the essential facts than an appellate court can hold
and he must be permitted to exercise some discretion, fructified by common sense, when dealing
with this necessarily difficult subject. Unless there
has been a distinct denial of a right guaranteed,
we ought not to interfere.
"In the present case the witnesses certainly
were not relieved from answering merely because
they declared that so to do might incriminate them.
The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well illustrated by the enforced answer, 'I don't know,' given
by Mason to the second question, after he had refused to replay under a claim of constitutional privilege."
In the instant case, LaRae Peterson had previously
indicated she did not know if it was possible for two
women to have any form of sexual relations; obviously,
after such a disclosure, there was no "real danger" of her
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being subjected to criminal punishment. The danger, if
any, was gone, since if she did not know if it was in fact
possible to have such a relationship, she could not have had
such a relationship as would subject her to punishment.
She was obviously raising the objection of self-incrimination to avoid disclosing non-criminative but otherwise important evidence, or to frustrate a legitimate inquiry of the
prosecution. In The Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. &S. 311, 121
Eng. Rep. 730 (1861), it was said as to the privilege:
"Further than this, we are of opinion that the
danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of
law in the ordinary course of things-not a danger
of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely
possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct.
We think that a merely remote and naked possibility, out of the ordinary course of the law and
such as no reasonable man would be affected by,
should not be suffered to obstruct the administration of justice. The object of the law is to afford
to a party, called upon to give evidence in a proceeding inter alios, protection against being brought
by means of his own evidence within the penalties
of the law. But it would be to convert a salutary
protection into a means of abuse if it were to be
held that a mere imaginary possibility of danger,
however remote and improbable, was sufficient to
justify the withholding of evidence essential to the
ends of justice."
The circumstances of the instant case are almost
squarely within those of the Mas on case referred to above;
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under these circumstances, it can hardly be said that the
trial judge, who saw the witnesses and their expressions,
abused his discretion in finding that there was no real
danger to appellant from answering the prosecution's
question.
Counsel has urged this court to push the concept of
self-incrimination beyond the rule laid down in Mason and
beyond the rule that has been generally recognized as being the standard to be applied in appraising whether or not
the answer to any question would tend to incriminate.
Counsel asks this court to adopt the position which he
acknowledges is the minority position13 espousoed by the
United States Supreme Court in Hoffman v. United States,
341 U. S. 479 (1951). This concept will allow a claim of
the privilege unless it were "perfectly clear" that the answer "cannot possibly" have a tendency to incriminate.
However, subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have not been willing to extend the rule beyond the facts in that case, and it appears that the cases
still require a showing of substantial likelihood of injury.
McNaughton, supra, 51 Jnl. Crim. L., Crim. & Pol. Sci., p.
138 (1960). McCormick, Evidence, p. 272 (1954) in this
regard, notes :

"* * * Fortunately, state courts which regard this change of view as unwise are free to ad13

See Wigmoft, Evidence, McNaughton Revision, Sec. 2260; McNaughton

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, its Constitutional Affectation'

Ra~r d'Etre a.nd Miscellaneous Implications, 51 Jnl. of Crim. Law:
Cnm. E1 Pol. Sci., p, 138, 152 (1960).
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here to the earlier and, it is submitted, more balanced and expedient attitude."
Indeed, any other rule would do violence to the balancing
test espoused by Justice Marshall in the case of United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas., 38, 39 (1807) .14 Since no
reason exists to go beyond the substantiality test which
appears to have been solidified by previous Utah decisions,
the court should reject that position. State v. Thorn, 39
Utah 208, 117 Pac. 58; State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351,
64 P. 2d 229. Consequently, applying the rules previously
noted that there must be a reasonable probability of substantial punitive injury to the witness, the appellant is in
no position to complain, since by her testimony prior to
the invocation of the privilege, she made it clear that she
could not possibly have engaged in any incriminating act,
HCounsel has in his brief cited United States V. Burr as standing for the
proposition that the self-incrimination provision really was intended to
extend beyon~ the rule that it must appear reaso·nably dear that a substantial injury upon answering would occur to a witness. It should be noted
that the Burr case was decided by Justice Marshall while acting as a Circuit Judge and not upon the Supreme Court. McCormick, Evidence p. 270
(1954) notes that reading the Burr case to stand for the proposition that
the appellant urges is to erroneously apply the case. He states: "The
classic statement on the question is that of Marshall, C. J. in Unt"ted State&
V. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40 (1807). as follows: "It is the province
of the court to judge whether any direct answer to the question which may
be proposed will furnish against the witness. If such answer may disclose
a fact which forms a necessary and,\ essential link in the chain of testimony
which would be sufficient to c.onvict him of any crime, he is not bo1und
to answer it, so as to furnish matter for that conviction. In such a case,
the witness must himself judge what his answer will be, and if he say,
on oath, that he cannot answer without accusing himse-lf, he cannot be
compelled to answer." This is susceptible of an interpretation giving too
wide a power to the witness, since almost any question "may" conceivably
in •theoretical possibility call for an answer which will the part of the
circumstantial proof of a ·crime. It must be qualified by the condition that
under all the facts the judge must find a substantial probability of danger.
See the later discussion .in this section. And Marshall's actual holding -that
a question to a witness as to his present knowledge of the meaning of a
letter in cipher (charged to be 'treasonable) was not privileged), because
present knowledge is not sufficient to prove prior knowledge at the time
of the plot, is consistent with that qualification."
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including sodomy, as that crime is defined in 76-53-22. 1 :;
Further, the term "homosexual act" has such gigantic
breadth and so many things are encompassed in the term
"homosexual" that do not include criminal conduct, that
there is little likelihood that the answer to the question
would tend to incriminate the appellant. In Blakiston's
Medical Dictionary, 2nd Ed., Homosexuality is defined as
follows:
"1. The state of being sexually attracted by
members of one's own sex. 2. The state of being
in love with one of the same sex. 3. In psychoanalysis, a form of homoerotism in which the interest is
sexual but sublimated, not receiving genital expression."16

Obviously, if homosexual is generally defined as not being
identified with overt sensuality in women, and if the witness in the instant case declined any knowledge of the
1&66-53-22 defines sodomy as the "detestable and abomina,ble crime against
nature, wrnmitted with mankind or with any animal with either the sexual
organs or the mouth * * *." No case has detcided in Utah whether
or not an act by two females can constitu.te sodomy. It wo,uld indeed be
impossible for two females to c.ommit sodomy in the normal sense of that
term since neither female could penetrate the other with any sexual organ
which was actually a part of their body. Some .form of false device
might be used, but this would) not constitute penetration lby a sexual
organ. In State V. Petersen, 81 Utah 340, 17 P. 2d 925 (1933). this
cQurt discussed the amended sodomy statute and ruled that an act of cunnilingus between a man and a woman would constitute sodomy. To extend
the sodomy statute to an attempt at cunnilngus between two women would
be ,most difficult since there could hardly be any penetration of the female
sex organ into the mouth of :the other female. Penetration iis the cl-assic
definition of a sexual crime between two persons in order to constitute
sodomy. It is clear, therefore, that appellant is endeavoring to unrealistically extend the criminal law.
16
Recent psychoanalytical studies have indicated th-at overt acts seldom accompany female homosexuality. See Lorand, Perversions, Psychodynamics
Therapy; in this regard Havelock Ellis, Studies in the Psychology of Sex,
Vol. 1. page 195, speaking of sexual inversion of women, notes:
**
Like other anomalies, indeed, in its more pronOIUnced forms it may be
less frequently met with in women; in its less pronounced forms almost
certainly, it is more frequently found.

"*

* * *"

'
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possibility of such actions, it can hardly be said that there
is any real and substantial danger that the answer to the
question as posed, on the basis of the record before the
court, would tend to incriminate the appellant.

POINT II.
THE APPELLANT COULD NOT AVAIL HERSELF OF A CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE THAT
THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION MAY
TEND TO DEGRADE HER SINCE THE QUESTION WAS DIRECTLY MATERIAL TO THE
ISSUE OF MOTIVE IN THE CASE OF STATE
VS. JEAN SINCLAIR.
Appellant, as part of her claim for reversal, contends
that she is entitled to invoke the degrading provision of
78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953. No cases are cited in support of her
position. The evidence of any homosexual relationship between the appellant and the defendant, Jean Sinclair, was
directly relevant to the prosecution's claim of motive. As
can be seen from the argument of the prosecutor in the
Jean Sinclair case in summation, the love letter between
the appellant and Miss Sinclair and the various other close
relationships between the ladies was contended to allow an
inference that Miss Sinclair killed the deceased out of jealousy because the deceased had diverted the affections of
the appellant from her. The statute which allows a witness
to claim a privilege against disclosing degrading testimony
is subject to the exception that if the answer sought would
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go

to the very fact in issue, or to a fact from which the fact

'in iJJsue would be p'resumed, the witness must answer.

In the instant case the fact of a jealous homosexual
relationship between the appellant and the defendant, Jean
Sinclair, would be a fact from which the ultimate fact of
the murder could be presumed since it would establish the
motive for the crime.
Various authorities have noted the limitations
right of a witness to invoke the privilege against
testimony which would tend to subject the witness
grace. Thus, McCormick on Evidence, page 269
notes:

on the
giving
to dis( 1954)

uln the early 1700s a privilege was recognized
against compelling answers, as to matters not material to the issues, which would disgrace or degrade, though not incriminate, the witness. This
privilege has become obsolete in England and in
most of our states, except where statutes have preserved the relic. The policy behind this former privilege is now more appropriately served by rules
restricting cross-examination as to collateral misconduct of a witness to impeach him, or permitting
the judge in his discretion to restrict it, and the
rule forbidding extrinsic proof of such misconduct."
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 2255, notes :
"The privilege against disclosing facts involving disgrace or infamy (i.e., irrespective of criminality) began to be recognized later than the privilege against self-incrimination and independently
of it. Its limitations were entirely distinct, in that
it did not cover facts merely 'tending' to disclooo
infamy, and did not apply to facts material to the
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issues (but only to ;collateral' facts,-practically,
to facts solely affecting credibility). * * *"
See also MeN aughton Revision, Sec. 2255.
The Territorial Supreme Court •early recognized the
limitation of materiality on the witness's right to refuse to
disclose degrading information. In Conway v. Clinton, 1
Utah 215, 220 ( 1875), it was stated:

"* * * but it is well-settled that a witness
is not bound to answer, nor a court to compel answer to an inquiry to disgrac-e a witness unless the
evidence is material to the issue being tried.
* * *"
A similar expression of the rule is found in State v.
Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229 (1937). In the
abortive case of In Re Sadleir, the court, in discussing the
degradation privilege, notes that it was available to the
witness in that case17 since the ultimate fact in issue was
never proved. Justice Wolfe, who concurl'ed initially as
to that aspect of the court's determination, and Justice
Moffat made it clear that had the ultimate fact been proved,
that the witness's answ•er would have been material.
In the instant case the court is confronted with no
such problem since the murder of Don Foster was obviously shown, and the question of identity of the defendant
was the material issu•e. To afford a witness the right to
claim a privilege against disclosing degrading information
should be noted that that case decided nothing as far as precedent is
concerned. Indeed, Justice Moffat did what Dean Wigmore indicated the
·courts had been unable to do, to-wit, utterly confuse the degradation privilege with the co·nstitutional privilege against self~incrimination.

17lt
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where such information would be directly relevant to the
corpus of the crime, or prove such an important aspect of
the crime as the motiv.e, would be. to place reputation above
the need for protection of society, something which, in this
day and age, would be an absurd and ludicrous result. It
is submitted that the appellant has no basis to invoke the
degradation provisions of 78-24-9.

POINT III.
THE TESTIMONY OF THE APPELLANT AT
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING IN THE CASE
OF STATE VS. JEAN SINCLAIR DEMONSTRATES THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR
A CLAIM THAT THE ANSWER SHE WOULD
GIVE IN RESPONSE TO THE PROSECUTION'S QUESTION, FOR WHICH REFUSAL
TO ANSWER SHE ·WAS HELD IN CONTEMPT, WOULD TEND TO INCRIMINATE
HER.
The appellant was called as a witness on behalf of
the State in the preliminary hearing of the same case,
State v. Sinclair, in which she was found in contempt at
trial for refusing to answer a question propounded by the
prosecution. The testimony of the preliminary hearing is
a part of the record in the case of State v. Sinclair, No.
9971. The record of the appellant's testimony given at the
preliminary hearing makes it manifest that there was no
substantial fear that her testimony would tend to incrim-
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inate her. In response to a question18 put by the prosecution, which was,
uQ. Did you and Jean Sinclair engage in immoral oox activities in that motel room on that
date?

"A. As far as doing anything immoral, no.''
Additionally, 19 in oosponse. to a question as to whether or
not Miss Sinclair had ever kissed the appellant on her
breasts, LaRae Peterson testified that she couldn't remember when. The question was aslved,2°
"Q. Is it your testimony under oath at this
time, Miss Peterson, that you cannot tell this Judge
of any time when this Jean Sinclair caressed and
kissed your breasts; is that your testimony under
oath?
"A. I cannot put a date on it, that is correct.'1

Additionally, the same record reflects~w that LaRae Peterson denied getting in bed with Miss Sinclair and performing sexual acts. As a consequ.ence, the only indication of
homosexual acts between Jean Sinclair and the appellant
is an inference from the appellant's way of answering at
the time of preliminary hearing that th.ere may have been
some fondling of the appellant's breasts by the defendant.21
This, of course, does not constitute sodomy nor violate any
provision of law, as the record makoes it clear that any relationship that may have transpired, of this very limited
nature, occurred in the privacy of Miss Peterson's home
lSR. 9971. page 306.
19Jbid., 309.
20Jbid.. 3 10.
21Jbid., 307-310.
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or residence. Thus, there is no evidence at all before this
court which would indicate anything other than that there
was no reasonable fear that the answer to the question
put by the prosecutor would tend to incriminate. At best,
the answer could only have tended to embarrass the appellant, and this provides no basis to claim a privilege
against self-incrimination, and since the testimony of the
appellant was directly material to the issue of motive, the
privilege against degradation was also not applicable.
The State does not contend at this point that the appellant has waived any right to claim the privilege against
self-incrimination by virtue of having testified at the preliminary hearing, since the weight of authority seems to
be to the contrary. In Re Neff, 206 F. 2d 149, 3rd Circuit
(1953); 136 A. L. R. 2d 1398. However, the State does
contend that the evidence offoered at the preliminary hearing depreciates the contention made by the appellant that
an answer given to the prosecution's question might tend
to subject her to punishment for a felony or other crime. 22
This evidence, when coupled with the other evidence at the
time of trial, negativing the real and substantial possibility
that the answer to the prosecution's qu-estion would tend
Were ~e issue to be presented, the State would contend, in spite of the
~u~onty to .the contra~, that once an answer has been given at a prelunmary heanng, there 1s no further reason to allow a witness, as distinct
from an accused, to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination since
at tha~ point the ad~ission is a matter of record and may be used against
the Wttness at any tlme. It would, therefore, not protect the witness to
allow a later invocation of the privilege, but rather, would frustrate the
prosecution in using evidence material to a particular case even though
!t co~ld use the same ~vidence having, obtained it at the preliminary hearmg. m a later prosecutton against the witness. The State's position is ·that
~ PUfPC?St of the privilege against self-incrimination having vanished the
pnvilege ttself should not be allowed.
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to incriminate the witness, warrants this court in affirming the finding of contempt.
CONCLUSION
The appellant in this case was at least a friend of the
defendant. By her own testimony on the witness stand,
there was no ignomineous relationship between she and
the defendant, Jean Sinclair, since had there been such a
relationship, she certainly would have had knowledge as
to the possibility of commission of sexual acts between
women. Additionally, the appellant's testimony at preliminary hearing negatives the possibility of criminality,
which leads to the conclusion that the relationship between
the appellant and the defendant, Jean Sinclair, although
unusual and possibly embarrassing to the appellant, was
not criminal. As a consequence, it is clear that there was
no ''real danger" that the answer to the prosecution's question could have subjected the appellant to crimina.l liability.
The appellant, in her brief, has relied primarily upon
decisions which constitute a minority position or which, in
the cited decision, have used broad language unsupported
by the result. The instant case offers a fact situation very
similar to that before the United States Supreme Court in
the case of Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362 (1917).
In that case the Supreme Court found that there was no
reasonable basis upon which the self-incrimination privileg.e could be invoked. The wisdom of that decision is applicable to the instant case, and the trial court, who had
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full opportunity to measure the sincerity of the witness,
facial expressions, and the extent to which the witness
pressed the privilege rather than collateral counsel, should
be sustained.
Further, the appellant's argument that somehow the
answer to the question involved might subject her to punishment for the crime of sodomy is more hypothoetical than
real. It is obvious that the protection claimed in the instant
case was not claimed in good faith. Consequently the privilege was not available.
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General,
RONALD N. BOYCE,
Chief Assistant
Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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